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Abstract. Access to external finance is a key challenge for the creation, survival and growth of SMEs. 
This article delves into the “weak funding” handicap of rural small firms (SEs): the access to bank 
financing and the substitutive role of trade credit for entrepreneurs in rural areas when they faced 
bank credit constraints. Considering SEs in Galicia (Spain), a paradigmatic case in Europe of rural 
areas in demographic decline with a strong impact of the Spanish sovereign and banking crisis of 
2008–2012. There’s evidence of firms in rural areas facing a differential negative flow of bank credit 
during the financial crisis, especially in the manufacturing and construction sectors, that dissipated 
afterwards. Then, using a panel data approach that considers the determinants of trade credit, the 
complementary and substitutive hypotheses are tested to estimate the impact of bank credit restric-
tions over trade credit. 
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Introduction 
Half the World’s population lives in cities today. In Europe, the increasing urbanisation is 
also a reality, but rural Europe is yet home to more than half of the population and covers 
more than three quarters of the territory. There is a growing view that a sustainable urban 
development depends on the prosperity of rural areas as well. However, growth prospects 
are sluggish in many rural regions, for demographic reasons, with depopulation and ageing 
threatening to marginalize them. Fostering entrepreneurship and business development of 
micro, small (SEs) and medium enterprises (SMEs) is a key target in the Europe2020 strategy, 
but SEs in rural areas face drawbacks such as dealing with lower demand and less favourable 
ecosystems, worse infrastructure and administrative burdens, weaker innovation abilities, 
and lack of access to private and public capital (Erjavec & Rickson, 2016).
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The motivation of this article is to delve into the “weak funding” handicap of rural firms. 
According to the OECD, access to finance is a significant challenge for the creation, survival 
and growth of SMEs (OECD, 2012). For rural firms, weak access to capital is a major bar-
rier (Civelek et  al., 2019). Bank credit constraints limit their growth, and financing costs 
are higher for “businesses located in remote and/or rural areas, potentially excluding them 
from any sources of formal external financing” (OECD, 2018, p. 8). The topic is gaining mo-
mentum. Several authors show that SMEs suffered from a significant credit crunch during 
the recent financial crisis (Carbó-Valverde et al., 2016). Bank lending to SMEs was reduced 
significantly after the financial crisis: from 2008 to 2011, by 47% in the EU, varying from 
21% in Italy to 82% in Ireland (McGuinness & Hogan, 2016). 
In this context, however, the access to financing by SEs in rural areas of Europe has been 
barely studied. Some alternatives to bank credit constraints, such as retained earnings or gov-
ernment subsidies, were hardly available during the crisis (OECD, 2018; Instituto de Crédito 
Oficial [ICO], 2014, 2015)1. Trade credit might have been the only bootstrap financing al-
ternative for many of these firms. The substitutive versus complementary role of trade credit 
has been covered in the literature, including Spanish firms (e.g., Martínez-Sola et al., 2017). 
Nonetheless, this research contributes in terms of the novelty of the contextual setting: a dif-
ferential substitutive role of trade credit for rural SEs was never tested. Recently, Del Gaudio 
et al. (2018) review the state of arts and observe a discrepancy of results, driven by the lend-
ing infrastructure of the country. We delve further into the territorial dimension of analysis.
This article analyses SEs in Galicia (Spain), an interesting case study for two reasons: be-
ing a paradigmatic case in Europe of rural areas in demographic decline, and the impact of 
the Spanish sovereign and banking crisis there. The structure is as follows. Section 1 reviews 
the literature on bank credit constraints and trade credit. In Section 2, variables and hypoth-
eses are defined. Section 3 introduces the case study, describes the dataset, and provides a 
descriptive analysis of bank credit and trade credit over the period of analysis. In Section 4, 
a panel data analysis is performed for the determinants of trade credit. The results are then 
discussed, followed by a final Section with a set of conclusions. Additional results are pro-
vided in a Supplementary Material (SM).
1. State of the art
Academics and practitioners identify three drawbacks for firms in rural areas. First, weak 
capacities, referred to those of the managers and firms (Erjavec & Rickson, 2016); second, 
weak infrastructure, including barriers such as the digital divide, limited access to research, 
and administrative burdens (European Commision, 2016); third, weak funding, referred to 
restricted access to private and public capital. This research deals with the latter topic. 
The conceptual framework combines a resource-based view theory of the firm, credit 
rationing by financial institutions, and the substitutive role of trade credit in face of bank 
1 To illustrate, the Spanish Credit Institute (ICO), the largest public finance agency, reports a sharp contraction of 
business credit lines, from 2010 to 2012, of –41.3%. Credit recovered afterwards, with a maximum in year 2014, 
once the sovereign crisis was over (ICO, 2015, p. 16). More than 60% of financing granted in year 2014 was to 
micro enterprises and self-employed. The credit crunch peaked in the second quarter of 2013 (ICO, 2014, p. 11).
618 D. Peón, X. Guntín. Bank credit and trade credit after the financial crisis: evidence from rural Galicia
credit restrictions. There is extensive literature on weak funding by rural SEs in emerging 
countries (de Castro & Teixeira, 2012). For Western countries, however, there is less research. 
Examples are Besser and Miller (2013) on U.S. rural entrepreneurs, Civelek et al. (2019) on 
Slovak weak funding bias compared to Czech Republic, and Khanal and Omobitan (2020) 
on factors influencing credit constraints of farms in the U.S.
In face of bank credit restrictions, trade credit may act as a substitute or a complement 
to bank financing:
 – According to the substitution hypothesis, if a firm faces bank credit constraints, trade 
credit plays a means of funding of last resort. Trade credit is often used as a substitute 
by small firms, who tend to face credit rationing more frequently.
 – The complementary hypothesis may obey to two reasons. At the individual level, if 
credit receivables exceed the maturity period of credit payables, the firm must use 
bank loans and short-term credit to meet its working capital requirements. At the 
industry level, firms with easier access to loans can facilitate the expansion of trade 
credit in the industry. Thus, it may be optimal for banks to lend to efficient firms at 
monitoring customers, which then refinance others through trade credit.
Psillaki and Eleftheriou (2015) obtain evidence of a flight-to-quality hypothesis: bank 
credit flows away from borrowers facing higher costs to larger, higher-grade firms. Palacín 
et al. (2019) find that the substitutive relation between trade credit and bank credit works 
better in countries with more efficient banks. However, this was rarely studied in relation 
to the rural setting in which firms operate. In advanced economies, results are inconclusive. 
Gustafson (2005) finds that rural U.S. SMEs with greater use of credit management systems 
act as lenders in trade credit relationships. Niskanen and Niskanen (2006) find that firms 
in urban areas of Finland offer and use more trade credit than their rural counterparts. In 
Italy, Cassia and Vismara (2009) find that companies tend to finance via suppliers when bank 
credit conditions are not good, but Deloof and La Rocca (2014) obtain opposite results. De-
loof et al. (2019) find that branch density in the region has a significant negative effect on the 
use of trade credit. An emerging line of research links the new financial technologies (Fin-
tech) to the financial inclusion of rural regions. Thus, Friedline et al. (2020) analyse whether 
Fintech help to expand access to financial services in rural areas of the U.S. However, most 
of this research is again oriented to emerging economies – e.g., Kohardinata et al. (2020) for 
Indonesia; Siddiqui and Siddiqui (2020), in India.
2. Variables and hypothesis development
Different measures of bank and trade credit are used. The credit a firm gets from financial 
institutions is measured through variable flow of short-term debt repayable within one year 
(ΔSTD). Trade credit may be measured through the accounts receivable-to-sales (RECS), 
which measures the trade credit offered to customers, or through accounts payable-to-assets 
(PAYAS), measuring the importance of trade credit in the financing of the firm.
The first hypothesis is whether firms operating in rural areas faced a differential bank 
credit constraint during the financial crisis. It is defined akin to Psillaki and Eleftheriou 
(2015) test for a differential performance of small versus large companies:
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H1: After the banking and sovereign debt crisis, loanable funds shift back to credit con-
strained firms in rural areas.
That is, if firms in rural areas had poorer access to bank credit during the worse years of 
the bank and sovereign debt crisis in Spain (years 2008 to 2012), one should observe how 
credit started to flow to these firms from year 2013 onwards. 
A second hypothesis seeks to describe the effects of the financial crisis over trade credit 
as well. The ultimate goal is to test whether trade credit acted as a substitute for financially 
restricted companies in rural areas; however, we firstly observe the impact of the crisis on 
trade credit. Following McGuinness and Hogan (2016), the hypothesis is defined as:
H2: Net trade credit reduced during the banking and sovereign debt crisis, particularly for 
firms in rural areas.
Following the liquidity and credit theory (Schwartz, 1974), firms with better access to 
bank credit offer trade credit to their customers (RECS) for their own profit. However, in a 
context of bank credit shortage, if trade credit acts as a substitute to bank credit, more firms 
would increase accounts payable (PAYAS), and reduce the financing they offer to their cus-
tomers (RECS). Thus, net trade credit (NTCS), measured as the ratio of accounts receivable 
minus payables scaled by sales, is used to test H2.
H1 and H2 are intended for descriptive purposes. A causal interpretation requires the 
formulation of alternative hypotheses that follow the literature on the determinants of capital 
structure and trade credit, respectively. The impact of the rural nature of firms over the access 
to bank credit is tested with hypothesis H3: 
H3: The flow in bank credit during the crisis was negatively related to the rural location of 
the firm.
To test H3, the flow of short-term debt repayable within one year (ΔSTD) is used as 
dependent variable, while the main explanatory variable is the rural nature of the firm (RE-
MOTE). Control variables follow the conceptual framework of determinants of capital struc-
ture. Borrowing from Psillaki and Eleftheriou (2015), debt borrowing depends on asset struc-
ture (FTA) measured by the ratio of fixed tangible to total assets, the profitability (measured 
by ROA) and the solvency of the firm (SR), measured by the ratio of after-tax income minus 
depreciation to total debt, as a measure of business risk. 
The effect of these control variables over ΔSTD depends on the theory followed. Thus, 
asset tangibility (FTA) would be positively related to debt, since asymmetric information and 
agency costs of debt induce lenders to require collateral (Scott, 1977), and funding costs are 
normally smaller for firms investing in PP&E than in intangible assets. However, a negative 
relationship may exist under an underinvestment or debt overhang situation, where firms 
with a stable source of internal financing are reluctant to seek external financing, overlook-
ing profitable investments if they benefit only creditors (Psillaki & Eleftheriou, 2015). Since 
most of the SMEs are of low asset base, FTA would have a negative relation to flow of capital, 
supporting a negative relationship of FTA and debt.
The relationship between profitability (ROA) and (short-term) debt would be negative 
according to the pecking-order theory (POT) because, under informational asymmetries, 
profitable firms would prefer internal to external financing, and risky debt to new equity 
(Psillaki & Daskalakis, 2009). However, a positive relationship appears under the trade-off 
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theory, due to the tax shield benefit of debt. This result depends on the existence of fiscal 
incentives supporting debt acquisition as a growth strategy for SEs. Finally, POT also predicts 
a positive relationship between solvency (SR) and leverage, since firms with higher business 
risk try to retain cash to avoid underinvestment. Contrariwise, a negative relationship is 
expected under an agency costs perspective (Harris & Raviv, 1990).
Finally, the role of trade credit as a substitute or complement to bank financing is tested 
separately for firms that had access to credit and for those that were restricted. Hypothesis 
H4a and H4b are defined as follows:
H4a: Under the complementary hypothesis, firms with a positive flow in bank credit offered 
more trade credit to their customers.
H4b: Under the substitution hypothesis, firms with a negative flow in bank credit more trade 
credit payables as a source of financing.
Following the literature of determinants of trade credit, the dependent variable for H4a 
is the ratio of accounts receivable to sales (RECS), and for H4b, the ratio of accounts payable 
to assets (PAYAS). Explanatory variables are flow of short terms debt (∆STD) and the rural 
nature of the firm (REMOTE). Control variables are of three types: creditworthiness, com-
mercial and operative motives, and financial motives.
Having access to alternative sources of financing explains why firms may lend to their 
customers or borrow from their suppliers. For SEs, the main sources are internal financing 
and bank credit. Hence, the ratio of internal financing (net profit plus depreciation expenses) 
scaled by sales (INTFINS) is used to explain PAYAS, and scaled by assets (INTFINA) to explain 
RECS – to avoid multicollineality of INTFINS. A positive relationship between INTFINA and 
RECS is expected, and, following POT, a negative relationship between INTFINS and PAYAS. 
Access to bank credit is measured with ΔSTD. In addition, we control for firms’ ability to get 
external financing with common proxies such as firms’ age (AGE) and size (logASSETS).
Commercial and operative motives follow three theories. First, price discrimination 
theory (Petersen & Rajan, 1997) suggests that trade credit allows firms to charge a higher 
price to less solvent customers. Thus, RECS would be positively related to higher operating 
margins (MARG), defined as the ratio of operating income to sales revenues. A negative 
relationship between MARG and PAYAS is expected, since firms that do not benefit from 
early payment discounts see their margin reduced. Second, if asymmetries of information 
exist between buyers and sellers, trade credit allow suppliers to guarantee the quality of their 
products (Smith, 1987) and obtain information about their customers’ solvency. Hence, asset 
turnover (TURN), defined as sales over (assets – accounts receivable), would be negatively 
related to RECS, since firms with lower sales turnover produce higher quality goods – qual-
ity controls extend the production cycle. TURN is not included to estimate PAYAS. Third, 
operative motives are based on obtaining higher levels of efficiency and cost reduction. On 
one hand, firms’ size (ASSETS) are positively related to RECS, since larger firms offer more 
trade credit due to economies of scale. On the other hand, trade credit gives flexibility to 
respond to variations in demand (Baños-Caballero et  al., 2016): the annual sales growth 
multiplied by two dummies is used, whether growth was positive (PGROWTH) or negative 
(NGROWTH). The impact over RECS may be positive or negative, depending on whether 
the company offers better conditions to their customers and sales follow, or they use trade 
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credit as a marketing mechanism to improve weak sales (Niskanen & Niskanen, 2006). For 
PAYAS, a positive relationship with PGROWTH (or NGROWTH) is expected because the 
higher growth, the more investment opportunities, and companies use trade credit to finance 
current assets. 
Financial motives to offer trade credit (RECS) are based on information asymmetries, 
now on the banks’ side: suppliers have a comparative advantage to monitorize their custom-
ers. Hence, the liquidity and credit theory predicts that short-term finance to sales (STFINS), 
defined as the ratio of current liabilities to sales revenues, will be positively related to RECS. 
Financial motives to use trade credit (PAYAS) may be of three types. First, the ratio of short 
term debts (current liabilities minus trade payables) to assets (STDA), with a negative re-
lationship if a substitution effect between short-term credit and trade credit exists. Second, 
for asset maturity purposes (working capital management), firms must balance the maturity 
of short-term liabilities with the liquidity of their assets. Here the ratio of current assets to 
total assets (CURRAS), with a positive expected relationship is used. Third, a substitution 
effect might also exist with long-term debts as well, and so leverage (LEVER) is included, 
measured as the ratio of long-term liabilities to capital, with a negative expected relationship.
3. Case of study and descriptive analysis
The case of study is introduced before addressing the empirical testing of the hypotheses. 
In the analysis of bank credit constraints by SEs operating in rural areas, Galicia – a NUTS 
level 2 region in the North-West of the Iberian Peninsula – is a case of great interest, for two 
reasons: demographic and financial. 
First, Galicia is a paradigmatic aged region in Europe in demographic decline. With an 
extension of 30,000 square km. and 2.75 million inhabitants, the average population age is 
four years higher than that of Spaniards and Europeans, and the fertility rate among the 
lowest in the world (1.07 children per woman), which contributes to a negative vegetative 
balance (–3.03 per thousand). Hence, it has historically lagged Spain in terms of population 
and GDP growth. The dynamics of its rural areas is worse. Almost 70% of the population 
Figure 1. Distribution of Galician population. Density by municipalities  
2011 and urban-rural typology
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lives in 15% of the territory, the Eixo Atlántico, a line that goes from North to the Portuguese 
border in the South and includes the largest urban centres – see Figure 1. 
Second, for financial reasons, the impact of the sovereign and banking crises. The bank-
ing sector in Spain experienced a complete restructuring process: the more than fifty banks 
and saving banks before 2009 were transformed into ten groups holding 80% of the assets, 
and savings banks disappeared. Credit decreased substantially since then (Figure 2). In this 
context, Spanish SMEs – 99.8% of firms offering 74% of total employment in 2011 – were 
severely affected. Galician economy suffered the bankruptcy of some of the largest industrial 
firms and the disappearance of all its local financial institutions. Branches were reduced by 
more than a third, leaving 40% of municipalities with only one branch or none.
Figure 2. Credit to households and firms. Spain, 1996–2017 (1996 base = 100)
To target a dataset of SEs that is representative of the Galician economy, we start with 
the sectoral distribution. Following the Galician Statistics Institute (IGE) classification of 
municipalities by its degree of urbanization, based on Eurostat’s DEGURBA standards, 242 
of them are rural (of a total of 315 in year 2016). That year, the largest sectors by number of 
firms were agriculture, forestry and fishing sectors (11.2%), food and beverages (3.9%), con-
struction and specialized construction (18.2%), wholesale trade (9.9%), retail trade (9.2%), 
and hotels and restaurants (6.9%). We focus on the most relevant: agrifood (NACE 1, 2, 3, 
10, 11), manufacturing of wood and metal (NACE 16, 25), construction of buildings (NACE 
41), wholesale trade (NACE 46), and the retail trade sector (NACE 47).
SEs are defined following the criteria by the EU Recommendation 2003/361/EC: firms 
are classified as small (micro) if staff headcount is less than 50 (10) and either turnover or 
balance sheet total is less than 10 (2) million. The database consists of stand-alone SEs in 
Galicia in the sectors above mentioned. Medium-sized firms (less than 250 employees, and 
either turnover or assets of less than 50 or 43 million euros) are not considered. Companies 
are classified as set either in urban, intermediate, or rural areas, following DEGURBA. Within 
rural firms, when they operate in rural (low) municipalities, they are classified as REMOTE. 
Then, the financial statements from 2008 to 2015 of all active and independent SEs with 
complete reports all years are retrieved from SABI Bureau van Dijk database. Cases with 
missing values for some variables or with errors in the accounting data are excluded. Thus, we 
require equity, revenues, assets, current assets, fixed assets, liabilities, and current liabilities 
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to be positive. 2,145 SEs are obtained, 372 from rural areas. Table 1 provides the number of 
observations, balanced in the territorial and sectoral dimensions.
Table 1. Territorial and sectoral distribution of the sample observations
Urbanisation Freq. Percent Cum. Sector Freq. Percent Cum.
Urban 5,192 30.26 30.26 agrifood 1,864 10.86 10.86
Intermediate 6,584 38.37 68.62 manufacture 2,152 12.54 23.4
Rural 5,384 31.38 100 construction 2,160 12.59 35.99
of which   wholesale 6,312 36.78 72.77
Remote 2,976 17.34 retail 4,672 27.23 100
Total 17,160 100 Total 17,160 100
The set of variables are provided in Table A1 in the SM. Correlation analysis excludes 
MARG from subsequent analysis, since its effect over RECS and PAYAS is explained by 
INTFINA and INTFINS, respectively. Total sales revenues (REVEN) was included only for 
descriptive purposes. Since flow variables miss the first year of data, the descriptive statistics 
exclude year 2008. In addition, all financial variables are winsorised at the 1% and 99% lev-
els – to mitigate the effect of extreme outliers. The dataset considers the refined number of 
firms and eight annual observations per company.
A descriptive analysis follows. First, the flow of bank credit (∆STD) and differences in 
trade credit policies (both RECS and PAYAS) for rural firms versus urban and intermediate 
areas, between the crisis (years 2009–2012, denoted P1) and post-crisis (2013–2015, P2). 
Figure 3 shows that both the credit restriction during the crisis and the back-to-normal per-
formance afterwards were stronger for remote rural firms. However, there are no differences 
overall in terms of trade receivables, either temporal or territorial, and the average use of 
supplier financing is higher during the crisis, but by firms of any kind.
Any distinctive behaviour may be due to differences across sectors. Indeed, as Table 2 
shows, weights by sector are quite different for rural municipalities, with less companies 
operating in trade sectors – wholesale and retail. Moreover, firms of these two sectors tend 
to use more supplier financing, and the retail sector offers little credit (RECS amounts only 
to 11.79%). Hence, for better interpretation, we compare the flow of bank borrowing, during 
and after the crisis, by sector in urban vs. remote rural settings (see Figure 4). 
Table 2. Number of observations and average trade credit figures by economic sector
agrifood manufacture construction wholesale retail Total
non_remote 1,211 1,470 1,456 4,718 3,556 12,411
% 9.76 11.84 11.73 38.01 28.65 100
remote 420 413 434 805 532 2,604
% 16.13 15.86 16.67 30.91 20.43 100
average RECS 20.55 27.41 27.16 20.64 11.79
average PAYAS 21.93 28.56 29.56 31.65 30.56
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Figure 3. Flow of bank credit and trade credit: mean (in %) during (2009–12)  
and after the crisis (2013–15)
Figure 4. Credit measures by sector and rurality, during and after the crisis
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Sectors struggled by the crisis were construction (mostly), manufacture and retail trade 
in rural areas, and wholesale trade in urban and intermediate. Most sectors and areas saw 
a credit recovery after the crisis, particularly construction, manufacture and retail in rural 
areas. For RECS, the only difference in trade credit offered to customers is sectoral, while 
higher levels after the crisis in manufacture and construction in rural areas are also observed. 
For PAYAS, there is lower use of supplier financing after the crisis in most sectors and geo-
graphical areas. In terms of rurality, it is clear the higher financing via suppliers by rural 
construction firms.
4. The impact of bank credit constraints over firms in rural areas
The descriptive analysis provided some intuition that the hypothesis of a differential bank 
credit constraint for firms operating in rural areas is correct, while the effects in terms of net 
trade credit are not obvious. Hypothesis H1 is now tested using a difference-in-differences 
(DiD) approach that helps identify whether loanable funds shift back to credit constrained 
firms in rural areas after the crisis. The empirical specification is:
 0 1 2 3STD ,it i t i t itD T D T∆ = γ + γ + γ + γ +ω  (1)
where subscript it refers to firm i at time t. The flow in bank borrowing (∆STD) is compared 
in terms of a dummy variable Di that takes value equal to 1 for rural firms and 0 otherwise, 
and in terms of a dummy variable Tt that takes values 0 during the credit crunch period 
(2009–2012) and 1 after the crisis. Finally, ωit is an error term.
The coefficient of interest is γ3: for H1 to hold it is required that γ3 > 0 (with γ3 > γ2). 
The results for the whole dataset (Table 3) show a γ3 effect that is positive and statistically 
significant (p = 0.017), and larger than γ2. Moreover, the impact of being rural over the flow 
of bank credit is negative (γ1 = –2.36), though statistically not significant. Testing by sector 
results in positive and significant evidence in manufacture, construction and retail.
Table 3. DiD test of hypothesis H1
Robust Robust
Coef. Std.Err t Coef. Std.Err T
IncSTD Construction
REMOTE –2.36 1.632 –1.45 REMOTE –10.93 4.710 –2.32**
P2 0.26 1.039 0.25 P2 –3.91 3.318 –1.18
DT 5.74 2.406 2.38** DT 16.60 5.752 2.89***
Agrifood Wholesale
REMOTE –2.03 4.855 –0.42 REMOTE 4.62 3.058 1.51
P2 –0.69 3.609 –0.19 P2 3.08 1.876 1.64
DT 4.16 7.229 0.58 DT –2.34 4.846 –0.48
Manufacture Retail
REMOTE –5.61 3.878 –1.45 REMOTE –4.18 2.481 –1.68
P2 –1.50 2.829 –0.53 P2 –0.71 1.511 –0.47
DT 10.59 5.841 1.81 DT 8.72 3.834 2.28
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Next, the impact in terms of trade credit, during and after the crisis, is compared by 
measuring the net trade credit (NTCS) as the ratio of accounts receivable minus payables 
scaled by sales – here following McGuinness and Hogan (2016). The way hypothesis H2 
is defined (“net trade credit is lower during the worse years of the banking crisis”) implies 
that it must be tested whether NTCS values increased in the post-crisis years (2013–2015). 
Table 4 provides a summary of results. Net trade credit is negative overall and for any sectors. 
Companies run, on average, a negative working capital, with more sales financed by suppli-
ers than financed to customers. This may be expected in retail-oriented industries – such as 
retail trade or construction, where figures are indeed more negative – but its pervasiveness 
across industries is remarkable: Galician firms have significantly sought to use trade payables 
to finance their activities, both during and after the banking crisis.
According to these results, NTCS values did not increase, generally speaking, after the 
worse years of the banking crisis. Mean values reduced anywhere except in agrifood, while 
ANOVA tests confirm that such decrease in net trade credit after the crisis is significant for 
the whole sample, and for firms outside rural areas. Median values, instead, are more stable. 
They only increased in agrifood, and rural areas. Thus, the increase in median values from 
–4.9 to –4.5 for rural areas is coherent with our intuition – despite a K-sample equality-of-
medians test suggests that it lacks of statistical significance. The different performance me-
dian vs. average suggests that “bad” debtor days deteriorated for some firms, pushing average 
figures down. This is confirmed by a negative skewness in all sectors and periods.
To sum up, the empirical evidence suggests firms used supplier financing to a large extent, 
but they continued to do so after the crisis. Nonetheless, the increase in median values for 
rural areas is coherent with the hypothesis. 
We move on to test the causal effect of the firms’ rural location over the flow of bank 
credit (hypothesis H3). The empirical specification is as follows:
 0STD 2 2 ,it i it t t i i it i t i itZ P REMOTE REMOTE P∆ =β +β + δ + + µ×ρ γ + + ε  (2)
where subscript it refers to firm i at time t, Zit is a vector of control variables (determinants 
of capital structure) that includes FTA, ROA, SR, and AGE. REMOTEi is a dummy variable 
equal to 1 if the SE operates in a remote rural municipality, as described in Section 3 and 
Figure 1, and P2 is a dummy variable equal to 1 for the post-crisis period. Finally, μi controls 
for the individual effects and εit is a random error.
For panel data models in which invariant regressors, such as REMOTE, are of particular 
interest, fixed effects estimator is not useful, as it uses data variation over time.2 When the 
Hausman test suggests that random effects estimation is neither a valid alternative,3 two 
solutions to obtaining estimations for invariant regressors are provided. The HT estimation 
method by Hausman and Taylor (1981) combines the fixed effects estimation with an IV 
estimation for the time-invariant regressors that are correlated with the individual effects. 
2 Since the within estimator is obtained with the variables in differences with respect to the individual means, the 
coefficients of time-invariant regressors are not identified. The basic alternative is the random effects estimate, but 
this is conditioned to the assumption that the regressors are not correlated with the individual effects.
3 The value of the Hausman test obtained in the contrast between fixed effects and random effects was 24.65 with 
a P-value = 0.0004. This leads to rejection of the null hypothesis that RE provides consistent estimates.
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The main criticism is that it requires an ex ante definition of a set of time-variant exogenous 
regressors (in a number equal to or greater than the number of time-invariant regressors to 
be tested) that are not correlated with the individual effects – since they act as instruments 
for the correlated invariant regressors. Some authors perform a Hausman test to compare the 
fixed effects and HT estimations, but this solution raises doubts since the contrast necessar-
ily excludes time-invariant regressors. Consequently, the PZ method by Pesaran and Zhou 
(2018) is used for robustness. Suitable for models where N is large and T is small, it allows the 
estimation of invariant effects whether the invariant regressors are correlated with individual 
effects or not. The estimators are robust with heterokedasticity and autocorrelation. In order 
to apply HT to the model in Eq. (2), P2 and the interaction REMOTE*POST are considered 
to be time-variant regressors that are not correlated with the individual effects. Table 5 sum-
marizes the results under the two estimation methods.
Table 5. Testing the causal effect of rurality over the flow of bank credit
Dependent variable: 
STD∆
ESTIMATOR HT  
(HAUSMAN-TAYLOR)
ESTIMATOR FEF  
(PESARAN-ZHOU)
Coef Std.Error Z Coef Std.Error T
TV exogenous
P2 –3.438 2.374 –1.45 3.179 2.428 –1.31
REMOTE × POST 5.256 2.651 1.98** 5.452 2.823 1.93**
TV endogenous
AGE 0.876 0.588 1.49 0.851 0.591 1.44
FTA –0.403 0.1001 –4.01*** –0.404 0.1004 –4.02***
ROA –0.567 0.1088 –5.21*** –0.575 0.1096 –5.24***
SR –0.001 0.0002 –3.65*** –0.001 0.0002 –3.73***
TI exogenous
REMOTE 0.917 2.013 0.46 0.489 2.112 0.23
_cons –3.266 10.832 –0.30
Nº obs. 11.972 11.972
Hausman test1 Vs. Within Effects: 0.79 (0.9978)
Note: * significant al 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. TV stands for “time variant”, TI 
for “time invariant”. Estimation Hausman-Taylor with robust estimate of variance-covariance matrix 
of the estimator.
1 χ-stat and P-value, test de Hausman based on the difference between ˆHTβ  and 
ˆ
Wβ . If Ho is rejected, 
only the within estimator is consistent. Null hypothesis is accepted. 
The effect REMOTE_POST (for firms in remote rural areas in the post-crisis period) 
is positive and statistically significant at p < 0.05. That is, the flow of bank credit improved 
5,250 euros on average for firms in remote rural areas after the banking crisis. Control vari-
ables FTA and ROA show a negative and statistically significant relationship with the flow of 
bank credit, suggesting both a debt overhang situation, and a capital structure in line with 
POT theory (firms preferring internal to external financing, but also there may have been 
no operative debt inducing fiscal incentives, or credit was indeed unavailable). The impact 
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of solvency (SR) is negative and statistically significant, against POT, with the implication 
that agency costs disincentived debt accumulation by credit constrained SMEs. The results 
are robust to alternative estimation models, HT and PZ. Moreover, a potential sectoral effect 
was tested – Table A2 in the SM – through a test of equality of coefficients between sectors, 
both in the x-axis and the angular coefficients (control variables). There is no evidence to 
reject the hypothesis, so a differential sectoral effect is not justified.
Finally, the causality of bank credit over trade credit policies is tested. Two separate hy-
potheses, H4a and H4b, were defined, so two static panel data are used, for RECS and PAYAS, 
to test whether the impact on RECS for firms that had access to bank credit during the crisis 
is positive (i.e., firms with access to bank financing offered trade credit to their more con-
strained customers), and whether the impact on PAYAS for firms that were credit restricted 
during the crisis is negative (i.e., credit constrained firms sought to finance via suppliers). 
Hypotheses H4a and H4b are defined in terms of the relationship of RECS and PAYAS with 
ΔSTD. That means, on one hand, that no ex ante hypotheses are made regarding what “rural-
ity” implies over RECS and PAYAS (the sign of the coefficient for REMOTE). On the other 
hand, it was confirmed above that rurality implies worse access to bank credit; now, we test 
whether this leads firms with credit restrictions to seek supplier financing – measured by 
ΔSTD beta. The models for RECS and PAYAS are:
 0 ;STDit i it i it i i i itRECS Z REMOTE= β +β + δ ∆ + γ +µ + ε   (3)
 0 STD ,it i it i it i i i itPAYAS Z REMOTE= β +β + δ ∆ + γ +µ + ε  (4)
where Zit is a vector of regressors that follows the literature on the determinants of trade 
credit, subscript it refers to firm i at time t, and where coefficients δit for ∆STDit and γi for 
REMOTE are the bank credit and rural effects to be tested, respectively. Moreover, μi controls 
for the individual effects of an unobservable nature, and εit is a random error. The regressors 
and the expected impact over the dependent variable were described in Section 2, and they 
are listed next. AGE2 is included to moderate the effect of higher values of the variable. For 
RECS, the model includes lnASSETS(+), AGE(+), AGE2, INTFINA(+), PGROWTH(+/–), 
NGROWTH(+/–), TURN(–), and STFINS(+). For PAYAS, we control for lnASSETS(–), 
AGE(–), AGE2, INTFINS(–), PGROWTH(+), NGROWTH(+), STDA(–), LEVER(–), and 
CURRAS(+). In both equations, P2 and the interaction REMOTE*POST are introduced to 
be time-variant regressors not correlated with individual effects. They allow to have enough 
uncorrelated regressors to perform a HT regression.
Both models were estimated considering fixed effects – confirmed by the Hausman test. 
Consequently, following the same reasoning as in the previous model, the presence of time-
invariant regressors leads us to choose the HT and PZ models. Table 6 summarizes the main 
results. In order to apply HT to models in Eqs. (3) and (4), AGE and AGE2 are considered 
to be time-variant regressors not correlated with the individual effects. 
Three are the most relevant results. First, there is significant evidence in favour of both 
hypotheses: firms with better access to bank credit increase the volume of trade receivables 
offered to customers (complementary hypothesis), while credit restricted firms seek more 
supplier financing (substitution hypothesis). Nonetheless, the impact is moderate: an increase 
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Table 6. Testing the complementary and substitution hypotheses
Dependent 
variable: RECS
ESTIMATOR HT TAYLOR) ESTIMATOR FEF (PZ)
Coef Std.Error Z Coef Std.Error T
TV exogenous TV
P2 0.246 0.316 0.78 0.296 0.315 0.94
REMOTE*POST –0.086 0.650 –0.13 –0.113 0.6497 –0.17
TV endogenous
ΔSTD 0.0052 0.0017 3.05*** 0.0052 0.0017 3.06***
AGE 0.0335 0.2024 0.17 0.0416 0.2026 0.21
AGEsq –0.0016 0.0051 –0.30 –0.0020 0.0051 –0.40
LnASSETS 10.175 1.1441 8.89*** 10.197 1.1432 8.92***
INTFINA –0.1210 0.0262 –4.62*** –0.1213 0.0262 –4.63***
PGROWTH –0.0320 0.0112 –2.86*** –0.0322 0.0112 –2.88***
NGROWTH –0.0807 0.0138 –5.83*** –0.0804 0.0138 –5.80***
TURN 1.1146 0.1613 6.91*** 1.1132 0.1612 6.91***
STFINS 0.0946 0.0117 8.07*** 0.0943 0.0117 8.06***
TI exogenous TI
REMOTE 1.6879 1.0666 1.581 1.806 1.154 1.57
_cons –51.296 7.358 –6.97 
Nº obs. 12920
Hausman test2 Vs. Within Effects: 1.62 (0.999)
Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. TV stands for “time variant”, TI for 
“time invariant”. Estimation Hausman-Taylor with robust estimate of variance-covariance matrix of the 
estimator. Hausman test fixed vs. random effects: H = 428, Prob > chi2 = 0.0000. The null hypothesis 
is rejected, then the random estimator is inconsistent.
1 p = 0.114. 2 χ-stat and P-value, Hausman test based on the difference between ˆHTβ  and 
ˆ
Wβ . If Ho is 
rejected, only the within estimator is consistent. The df() would be determined by the overidentifying 
restrictions in the Hausman–Taylor estimation. The null hypothesis is accepted.
Dependent variable: 
PAYAS
ESTIMATOR HT ESTIMATOR FEF (PZ)
Coef Std.Error Z Coef Std.Error T
TV exogenous TV
P2 1.240 0.2315 5.36*** 1.255 0.2310 5.44***
REMOTE*POST –0.319 0.5470 –0.58 –0.308 0.5473 –0.56
TV endogenous
ΔSTD –0.0034 0.0014 –2.41** –0.0034 0.0014 –2.41**
AGE –1.657 0.1896 –8.74*** –1.655 0.1908 –8.72***
AGEsq 0.0127 0.0048 2.66*** 0.0125 0.0048 2.61***
lnASSETS 9.617 0.9969 9.65*** 9.618 0.9965 9.65***
INTFINS –0.242 0.0217 –11.14*** –0.242 0.0217 –11.15***
PGROWTH 0.0302 0.0063 4.84*** 0.0302 0.0062 4.84***
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(decrease) of 100,000 euros in bank credit lead to an increase of 0.52 percentage points (0.34 
percentage points) in the ratio of receivables to sales (payables to assets). 
Second, all control variables show a significant effect, and signs coherent with the most 
frequent results in the literature except STFINA for RECS and lnASSETS for PAYAS. In par-
ticular, the negative coefficients for PGROWTH and NGROWTH in the equation for trade 
receivables suggest firms use trade credit as a marketing mechanism to improve weak sales. 
Third, remoteness implies both more offering and use of trade credit, but the effects are only 
weakly significant (p ≈ 0.1 both for RECS and PAYAS). The results are robust to alternative 
estimation models, HT and PZ. Also for robustness, a sectoral effect was tested – Table A3 
in the SM: models were re-estimated to allow the relationship between RECS (PAYAS) and 
IncSTD to be different across sectors (through multiplicative sectoral dummies). There is no 
econometric evidence to reject that the angular coefficients of the sectored IncSTD variable 
are equal, so a differential sectoral effect is not justified.
Hence, firms in remote rural locations receive and extend more trade credit. This goes 
against Niskanen and Niskanen (2006)’s findings, but they used data prior to the financial 
crisis. In addition, there is evidence of the complementary hypothesis of trade credit, where 
firms with better access to bank credit extend more trade credit, consistent with most re-
cent articles. There is also evidence of the substitution hypothesis: firms facing bank credit 
restrictions make greater use of trade credit, consistent as well with other results in Spain 
(e.g., Carbó-Valverde et al., 2016). Obtaining positive results for the two hypotheses is in line 
with the idea that both the complementary and substitution hypotheses may coexist (Garcia-
Appendini & Montoriol-Garriga, 2013). Nonetheless, the evidence is moderate in both cases 
in quantitative terms, but robust to two alternative estimation models.
Dependent variable: 
PAYAS
ESTIMATOR HT ESTIMATOR FEF (PZ)
Coef Std.Error Z Coef Std.Error T
NGROWTH 0.0761 0.0080 9.55*** 0.0762 0.0080 9.57***
STDA –0.374 0.0206 –18.11*** –0.374 0.0206 –18.12***
LEVER –0.166 0.0137 –12.07*** –0.166 0.0137 –12.08***
CURRAS 0.120 0.0195 6.15*** 0.120 0.0195 6.14***
TI exogenous TI
REMOTE 1.8019 1.1528 1.561 1.8373 1.1816 1.55
_cons –4.185 5.7450 –0.73
Nº obs. 13141
Hausman test2 Vs. Within Effects: 0.41 (0.999)
Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. TV stands for “time variant”, TI for 
“time invariant”. Estimation Hausman-Taylor with robust estimate of variance-covariance matrix of the 
estimator. Hausman test fixed vs random effects: H = 685, Prob > chi2 = 0.0000. The null hypothesis 
is rejected, then the random estimator is inconsistent.
1 p = 0.118. 2 χ-stat and P-value, Hausman test based on the difference between ˆHTβ  and 
ˆ
Wβ . If Ho is 
rejected, only the within estimator is consistent. The df() would be determined by the overidentifying 
restrictions in the Hausman–Taylor estimation. The null hypothesis is accepted.
End of Table 6
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Conclusions
SEs operating in rural areas often lack of sufficient access to capital. This article delved into 
the “weak funding” handicap of rural firms by using a dataset in Galicia, where the Spanish 
banking crisis hit particularly hard. The descriptive analysis shows that the credit shortage 
during the crisis and the recovery in the flow of bank credit afterwards were stronger for 
rural firms. However, no relevant differences in terms of trade credit are observed. Testing 
the differential flow of bank credit to rural firms, an average increase of 5,300 euros after 
the banking crisis is obtained. The results are akin to the flight-to-quality hypothesis, here 
specifically for rural SEs.
Some policy implications follow. Rural firms must be aware of their dependence from 
bank credit, which often leads them to be excluded from regular financing circuits in periods 
of distress. The digital transformation may be an opportunity for them to solve this uneven 
access to traditional financing sources, by making use of financing opportunities such as 
crowdlending and P2P marketplaces. It would be interesting to observe whether these new 
Fintech companies are contributing to financing rural SEs in more recent times. For govern-
ments, the evidence of financial exclusion by the banking sector would support affirmative 
action in favour of start-ups and other firms in rural areas, particularly in times of financial 
straits. Financing vehicles such as grants, soft loans, and guarantees might be used. Moreover, 
the excess trade financing capacity of some sectors in rural areas may be utilized in other 
industries. Still, governments must be aware of possible damaging effects: structural break in 
SE financing engendered by policy thrusts during the crisis may have been responsible for 
exacerbation of trade credit substitution at the end of the crisis.
The article contributes to a weakly studied area: the access to bank credit by SEs in rural 
areas of Europe, and a differential substitutive role of trade credit related to the rurality at-
tribute of the firms. The results confirm authorities’ and practitioners’ concerns about weak 
access to capital being a major barrier for the creation and survival of SMEs, particularly in 
rural areas. Firms remain too dependent on bank credit, and when they lack access to it, the 
greater substitution effect of trade credit confirms a worse access to other alternative sources. 
Moreover, depending on trade credit financing from suppliers and restricting commercial 
credit to customers implies a loss of competitive position, more acute the greater the bargain-
ing power of customers and suppliers.
The main limitation comes from data available: access to bank credit was measured by 
the short-term debt in the balance sheet at year-end. Besides, it cannot be observed whether 
firms are using early payment discount and what is the cost of using trade credit. Future stud-
ies should use surveys to obtain direct measures of credit availability and use of trade credit 
to confirm the results. In particular, to check whether the significant impact (an increase of 
0.34% of trade credit financing for each 100 mil euros) of reduced credit may be attributable 
to additional factors. Likewise, the research uses financial data from years 2008 to 2015. Such 
range was required to test the impact of the bank crisis in Spain before and after 2012, and six 
years is fair enough for a panel data analysis with the use of alternative econometric methods 
and robustness tests performed. That makes the analysis relevant for today, but it is open to 
more contributions in the field. Indeed, in Spain, the restructuring process of the banking 
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industry continues today (with the merge in 2020 of Bankia and CaixaBank becoming the 
largest national bank) and, globally, with the emerging academic interest about the impact 
of Fintech on financial inclusion. 
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